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Abstract
Within the standard RBC model we examine issues of expectational
coordination on the unique rational expectations equilibrium. We show
the sensitivity of agents’ plans and decisions to their short-run and long-
run expectations is too great to trigger eductive coordination in a world
of rational agents who are endowed with knowledge of the economic
structure and contemplate the possibility of small deviations from equi-
librium: eductive stability never obtains. We conclude adaptive learn-
ing must play a role in real-time dynamics. Our eductive instability
theorem has a counterpart under adaptive learning: even with asymp-
totic stability the transition dynamics can involve large departures from
rational expectations.
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1 Introduction
The question of expectational coordination has returned to the forefront of
intellectual debate in the context of the economic crisis that began in 2007.
Some people have argued that the overly optimistic view of the world conveyed
by our models arises in particular from the universal adoption of rational
expectations (RE). In fact, the axiomatic use of RE has been under critical
examination for some time: what is at stake in this debate is the robustness
of expectational coordination on RE. This issue, the subject of the present
paper, has been discussed using a variety of approaches.
Problems of multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria (REE) have
received considerable attention, as in the sunspot literature, e.g. Benhabib
and Farmer (1994) and Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991), and in the global
games literature, e.g. Morris and Shin (1998). The existence of multiple REE
arises also in the New Keynesian model, most dramatically in connection with
the zero lower bound, e.g. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001). The
possibility of multiple REE most obviously and forcefully raises the issue of
coordination of expectations.
However, coordination of expectations on RE is crucial also in models with
a unique REE. Rational expectations must be viewed as an equilibrium con-
cept. In game theoretic terms the REE is a Nash equilibrium, not a dominant
strategy equilibrium. Put differently, it is rational to have RE only if the ex-
pectations of other agents are in accordance with RE. This unavoidably leads
to the question of how agents would come to coordinate on the REE.
One approach to this question examines the stability of the REE under
adaptive learning. See, for example, Marcet and Sargent (1989), Woodford
(1990), Brock and Hommes (1997) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Most
prominently, under the least-squares learning approach, agents form expec-
tations like statisticians or econometricians, updating their forecasting model
over time as new data become available. This is a “bounded rationality” ap-
proach because the agents do not explicitly take account of the self-referential
aspect of the model; and, consequently, agents can learn to have RE only as-
ymptotically as they update their forecast models to observed data over time.
A second approach, called the “eductive” viewpoint, is the main focus
of the current paper. See Evans and Guesnerie (1993, 2005) and Guesnerie
(2002) for an introductory conceptual assessment in dynamic models. Under
this approach, agents are assumed to be rational and to fully understand the
structure of the economy. These authors argue that in some cases a mental
reasoning process allows agents to deduce that the REE will obtain, in which
case the REE is said to be eductively stable. This would provide strong support
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for RE, because RE is then attainable through mental reasoning and does not
require the gradual accumulation of data over time.
Consider, for example, an unexpected permanent change in fiscal policy.
One of the attractions of the RE approach is that, in the event of such a struc-
tural change, agents fully incorporate into their decision-making the resulting
future changes in the equilibrium paths of wages and interest-rates. Educ-
tive stability of the equilibrium would provide support for the assertion that
coordination on this revised RE path could be quickly achieved by our fully
rational agents: the usual textbook RE solutions would be fully vindicated.
In this paper we focus on eductive stability and expectational coordination
in models in which agents are long-lived, or more precisely, far-sighted. The
logical framework and the central results for eductive learning, as well as the
connections with adaptive (or “evolutive”) learning and the issue of sunspot
multiplicity, are well understood in many contexts where agents are short-lived,
such as simple overlapping generations models: see Gauthier and Guesnerie
(2004). With long-lived agents, and this is a key message of our findings in
this paper, the picture changes significantly.
The assumption that agents are long-lived is not economically innocuous.
For example, long-lived agents take into account their lifetime income rather
than income over a short horizon, a fact that of course has a key impact on
the understanding and design of macroeconomic policies. This suggests, unless
the RE-hypothesis is accepted axiomatically, that the effect of the presence of
long-lived agents on eductive stability should receive careful attention. Does
this make expectational coordination more or less robust?
To explore this complex question, we consider in this paper the simplest
version of a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model and its standard focal point,
the REE, which is presented in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we investigate a
background question that is central for any assessment of the plausibility of
expectational coordination on the REE: how do actions and plans of agents
react to out-of-equilibrium beliefs? The answer, for small changes of beliefs,
is provided by the planning theorem, Theorem 1, which appears to be new
to the literature. This theorem identifies the changes in consumption and
savings decisions associated with a small change in the whole infinite trajectory
of beliefs, providing rich and comprehensive information on this question. We
obtain a key expectational feedback parameter , depending on the underlying
model specification, which governs the response of plans to beliefs.
In Section 3, we develop the eductive approach. We define (local) educ-
tive stability in an abstract setting, illustrate it using the cobweb model, and
then show how to apply the framework to the RBC model. The question is
whether rationality and knowledge of the economic structure can trigger a
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mental reasoning process leading to coordination on the REE. The reasoning
process we envision is as follows. Suppose agents believe that the time-path of
the economy will be in a neighborhood of the REE, and they consider the set
of possible outcomes based on plans consistent with those beliefs. If this set
of outcomes lies in a strictly smaller neighborhood of the REE then it would
be natural for rational agents to revise their beliefs and reconsider the implied
outcomes. Eductive coordination obtains if iteration then selects the REE.
We find that coordination on the REE in the RBC model is difficult. In-
deed, Theorem 2 of Section 4 establishes the impossibility of local eductive
stability. Thus, complete coordination on the REE time path cannot be ex-
pected. There is no collective view of the future — no natural set of paths close
but not identical to the self-fulfilling, equilibrium path — that is able to trigger
coordination on the equilibrium, along the eductive lines just described. Tak-
ing a real-time perspective, every such collective view is subject, at some stage,
to be invalidated by facts. Put more dramatically, in this world, a “crisis,”
here an expectational crisis, is unavoidable, although the time required for
the crisis to become manifest, i.e. the extent of the weakness of expectational
coordination, depends upon expectational feedback parameter .
What should we conclude from the instability results of Section 4? The
REE remains the natural benchmark since it is uniquely the one in which
agents would be unable to improve on their forecasts. However, the clear
implication of eductive instability is that coordination on the REE can only
be attained by an adaptive learning process, a process in which expectations
respond to data over time. Returning to our hypothetical example of an unan-
ticipated novel policy change that disturbs an RE steady state, renewed ex-
pectational coordination after the structural break cannot be immediate and
can only take place over time.
Section 5 therefore takes up adaptive learning. Although it is known that
the REE in the RBCmodel can be asymptotically stable under adaptive learn-
ing rules, our objective is to determine the links between our eductive instabil-
ity result and adaptive learning dynamics. The planning theorem of Section
2 again plays a central role. In addition, drawing inspiration from the frame-
work of Section 3, we develop a new stability notion for adaptive learning that
emphasizes the extent of deviation from RE.
Specifically, in Section 5 we examine what we call “B-stability”: consis-
tency of the realized path with initial beliefs that the path will remain in a
specified neighborhood of the equilibrium. As is well-known, adaptive learning
dynamics depend on the “gain” parameter 0   ≤ 1 that governs the extent
to which expectations respond to observed data. The equilibrium paths under
learning depend both on  and .
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Section 5 obtains both negative results, reflecting the earlier eductive in-
stability results, and some more positive results that reflect the potential for
stability under adaptive learning. The negative result, Theorem 3, is that the
REE is never robustly B-stable under adaptive learning: the consistency of
conjectured beliefs paths is not robust in the sense that this collective view of
the future will be falsified, at some point in time, for a large set of adaptive
learning rules indexed by the gain . In particular, despite the REE being
asymptotically stable for sufficiently small , the deviation of the learning dy-
namics from the REE can become arbitrarily large. Theorem 4 provides more
complete results on asymptotic and partial B-stability.
The results of Section 4, complemented by those of Section 5, indicate
that full coordination on the REE is implausible: starting from an RE steady
state, if there is an unanticipated structural or policy change, then, even if the
nature of this structural change is fully understood, it will take time for agents
to coordinate on the REE, and deviations during the learning transition can
be large. The concluding Section 6 discusses directions for future research.
2 Model and Planning Theorem
We consider a standard RBC model, except that for simplicity we assume a
fixed labor supply and omit exogenous productivity shocks.1 These simpli-
fications, which amount to a focus on a nonstochastic discrete-time Ramsey
model, are not critical to our results and are made in order to clarify the central
features of our analysis. Elimination of both random shocks and labor-supply
response to disequilibrium expectations can be expected to facilitate coordi-
nation on the rational expectations equilibrium (REE).2 Despite eliminating
these influences we establish that eductive stability fails.
2.1 The model and equilibrium
There is a unit mass of identical infinitely-lived households, indexed by  ∈
. At time  each household  holds capital (), resulting from previous
decisions, and supplies inelastically one unit of labor. At time  = 0, facing
interest rate 0 and prospects of future interest rates  and wages , household
1Seminal RBC papers include Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983).
2For example, the expectational feedback parameter, which we denote by  below, can
be shown to be larger in magnitude when labor supply is elastic.
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 determines his actions today and plans for the future by solving
max 0()
∞X
=0
(()), where 0    1, (1)
subject to +1() = (1 + )() +  − () (2)
with initial wealth 0() given. Here 0() captures the expectations of agent
 formed using his subjective distribution.
We will focus on the case in which 0() is the same for all agents, but we
do not impose this initially. The utility function () is increasing, strictly
concave and smooth. We further impose a No Ponzi Game (NPG) condition
that the present value of their limiting lifetime wealth be nonnegative. The
household’s Euler equation is
 0(()) = () ((1 + +1) 0(+1())) . (3)
When the future is viewed as deterministic, expectations of future interest
rates  and wages  are point expectations. Iterating forward the household
flow budget constraint, and imposing the NPG and transversality conditions,
gives the lifetime budget constraint of the household:
∞X
=0
() =
∞X
=0
+(1+ 0)0(), where  =
Y
=1
(1+ )−1, 0 = 1 (4)
Goods are produced by firms from capital and labor using a constant re-
turns to scale production function (), satisfying the usual assumptions,
under conditions of perfect competition. In particular, firms hire labor and
rent capital in competitive factor markets. Because labor is inelastically sup-
plied,  and  are given by  = ( 1) −  and  = ( 1) where
 = R (),  = ,  = , and 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is the depre-
ciation rate. It follows that prices in time  are entirely determined by the
level of aggregate capital , which itself is predetermined, i.e. determined by
aggregate savings in period − 1.
For convenience, below, we also write () in place of ( 1) and use the
notation  0 =  and  00 =  . In addition we have the aggregate capital
accumulation equation
+1 = (1− ) + ()−  where  =
Z

() (5)
In this model, the definition of an intertemporal perfect foresight equilibrium
requires that agents satisfy their Euler equations and flow budget constraints
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at each , their intertemporal budget constraint, and that their expectations
are consistent with the actual path of the economy. The model has a unique
a (unique) perfect foresight steady state, on which we focus attention.
Definition 1 The perfect foresight steady state = () = ¯,  = () =
¯,  = ¯ and  = ¯ is given by 1 = (1+ ¯), ¯ = (¯ 1)− , ¯ = (¯ 1),
¯ = (¯ 1)− ¯ = ¯¯ + ¯
If 0 = ¯ then under perfect foresight the economy stays in the steady
state for all , and if0 6= ¯, then there is a unique perfect foresight path that
converges to the steady state as  → ∞. We now assume that the economy
is initially in the steady state, with 0() = ¯ for all , and we examine the
robustness of expectational coordination on this equilibrium.
2.2 Beliefs, actions, plans and realizations
Consider an individual agent facing the consumption/savings problem (1)-(2).
The behavior of the agent is in part determined by his beliefs about the future
values of wages and interest rates. In general, an agent’s beliefs could be
stochastic, summarized by a sequence of joint density functions {( )}
where  and  are the time  wage and interest rate histories, respectively.
We focus on deterministic beliefs, i.e. on point expectations, for reasons given
later. This is natural given that our reference solution is nonstochastic and our
analysis is local; also, this facilitates tractability.
The beliefs of agent  may be summarized by real sequences of expected
wages and interest rates. We assume the agent understands the relationship
between aggregate capital and input prices, that is, the agent knows  =
 0()−  and  = () −  0() Hence his beliefs are completely and
consistently captured by a sequence identifying his point expectations of future
capital stock. We denote these beliefs by() = { ()}≥1A beliefs profile
is the collection of all agents’ beliefs:  = {() :  ∈ }.
The key ingredient of our analysis is the understanding of the effect of
changes in individual expectations on changes in individual actions or plans
(particularly when these changes occur near the equilibrium). Taking as refer-
ence point the perfect foresight steady-state path 0 = ¯ = ¯, for all ,
we examine the solution to the program, which gives the agent’s present ac-
tions and future plans. This is simply the program (1) subject to (4), where 
and  are replaced by  () and  (), derived as just explained from  ().
We focus on small changes, around the steady-state values, in the individual
agent’s initial capital 0() and point expectations  (), and on the effect
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of these small changes on the agent’s initial plans. We measure these small
changes in capital as deviations from steady state: we set 0() = 0()− ¯
and  () =  ()−¯. We also write () = { ()}≥1 for the beliefs
path of agent , and  = {() :  ∈ }. Similarly, for the agent’s
corresponding optimal plans () and (), which as we will see are fully
determined by their beliefs and their initial capital holdings, we write () =
{()}≥1 where () = ()−¯ and () = {()}≥0 where () =
()−¯. At this stage we maintain the assumption that each agent’s plans are
well captured by first-order approximations. We justify this assumption later.
Given this assumption, we can identify a particular variable’s time path with
its first-order approximation, and thus use our deviation notation to capture
this identification.
2.2.1 Expectations and plans of agents
Our objective is to determine the agent’s plans as functions of the agent’s
expectations and initial savings. We begin with two fundamental lemmas.
Lemma 1 Given a time path of beliefs { ()}≥1, the optimal consumption
and savings paths for agent  satisfy
+1() = () + −1¯ 00+1() (6)
+1() = −1()− () (7)
where  = −¯ 00(¯) 0(¯) is the consumption elasticity of marginal utility
and where  00 denotes  00(¯)
Lemma 2 (Welfare Lemma). Given a time path of beliefs { ()}≥1, ini-
tial saving 0() and aggregate capital stock 0, the optimal consumption
path for agent  satisfies
−1() =
X
≥0
+() for all  ≥ 0 (8)
The proofs of these and all results are in the Appendix. Lemma 1 specifies
the agent’s Euler equation and flow budget constraint to first order. We re-
mark that the simple form of linearized budget constraint (7) arises from the
absence of an income effect, i.e. in a competitive equilibrium  + ¯ = 0.
Lemma 2, which is derived using this observation and the linearized life-time
budget constraint (LTBC), can be made stronger: it is not necessary that the
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consumption path be optimal, it need only satisfy the LTBC. However, an
important implication of Lemma 2 is that, to first order, changes in beliefs do
not impact welfare: () =P≥0  0(¯)() = 0.
It is useful to define the “expectations feedback” parameter
 = −−1(1− )−12¯ 00  0
which will be of considerable interest, as it plays a central role in determining
the responsiveness of consumption and savings plans to changes in expectations
of the aggregate capital path.
An implication of the preceding results is that an agent’s optimal time
 consumption () and saving +1() are functions of his future beliefs©+()ª≥1 and his realized time  capital holdings ():
Lemma 3 Given beliefs path (), the optimal plans for agent  satisfy
() = −1(1− )() + −1(1− )
X
≥1
+() (9)
+1() = ()− −1(1− )
X
≥1
+() (10)
Finally we give the planning theorem, which specifies the optimal plans
() = {()}≥1 and () = {()}≥0 as functions just of the beliefs
path (). The planning theorem is most conveniently expressed in terms
of the following semi-infinite matrices:
Θ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1−   − 2 2 − 3 · · ·
1−  1− 2  − 3 · · ·
1−  1− 2 1− 3 · · ·
1−  1− 2 1− 3 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
and Θ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
− −2 −3 · · ·
1−  −2 −3 · · ·
1−  1− 2 −3 · · ·
1−  1− 2 1− 3 · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

that is, Θ = ¡Θ¢ and Θ = ¡Θ¢, where
Θ =
½ − −  if 1 ≤   
1−  if  ≥  and Θ
 =
½ − if 1 ≤  ≤ 
1−  if    
Recalling that () = {()}≥1 and () = {()}≥0, agent ’s opti-
mal plan in terms of his belief path (), is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Planning Theorem). Assume 0() = 0. Given beliefs path
(), the optimal plans for agent  are given by
() = Γ (()) ≡ −Θ()
() = Γ (()) ≡ −−1(1− )Θ()
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Figure 1 illustrates the results for ()  0 and  () = 0 for  6=  .
Note that the impact on () is negative for all  ≥ 1 while the impact on
() changes sign over time. We emphasize this point in the next section.
Figure 1: Impact on planned () () of a future one-period increase of
 () for alternative values of  .
Intuitively, ()  0 and  () = 0 for  6=  implies that expected 
is negative while  = 0 for  6=  . From the Euler equation (3) consumption
will be constant both before and after  =  , and from period  − 1 to
period  consumption must fall. The lifetime budget constraint (4) implies
that ()  0   for    ≤ : the low interest rate in period 
induces households to move consumption from later to earlier periods. To
understand the corresponding path of savings (), observe that to support
the relatively high level of consumption for    , households must reduce
their savings over time; after period  , facing interest rates that remain at the
steady-state level, households consume an amount equal to their total labor
and capital earnings and hence their savings remain constant.
2.2.2 Implications of the planning theorem
The planning theorem, through the expectations feedback parameter  and
the matrices Θ and Θ, fully describes the connection between expectations
and the planned actions of the individual agents. We will later exploit this
knowledge to obtain consequences of these beliefs for describing the possible
corresponding paths of aggregate capital. At this stage we provide intuition
for later results, limiting attention to discussion of the effects of beliefs on the
plans of individual agents.
First we note that the general sensitivity of decisions to expectations is
governed by the value of  A high  means that the individual decisions and
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plans react strongly to expectations. We discuss later the interpretation of
 but it is intuitively clear that a high  00 or a low  increases expectational
sensitivity. In addition to this general expectational sensitivity, our results
also stress the profile effect of beliefs, which are fully captured by the above
matrices. Taken together, we get rich information — indeed exhaustive to first-
order approximation — giving the effects of beliefs on the agent’s plans.
This information can be used to provide a more comprehensive intuition
about agents’ plans. Here we pick out three insights,3 Corollaries 1 — 3, which
are particularly relevant for what follows.
First, as foreshadowed above, a striking and immediate implication from
inspecting Θ is the following corollary on strategic substitutability.4
Corollary 1 The map Γ exhibits local strategic substitutability, i.e.
 (())
 ( ())  0 for all   ≥ 1
Second, consider beliefs of the form −   ()   for all  ∈ N, where  0. Implications for savings in period one, 1(), which then follow from
the first row of Θ, are given by Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 If −   ()   for all  ≥ 1 then −  1()  
Third, the connection between the infinite path of beliefs and the individual
savings decision is further clarified by the following example. Suppose that
expected capital is above the steady state by a fixed amount   0 for   0
periods before reverting to the steady state. That is, suppose the agent ’s
beliefs profile, (), satisfies
 () =
½  for  = 1     
0 for     (11)
Because of its later importance, we call these “-period deviation” beliefs. By
acting on (), the operators Γ and Γ yield the savings and consumption
plans of agent , respectively: () = Γ (()) and () = Γ (()).
3There are many others. For example, the reader is invited to compute the sum of the
rows of each matrix to evaluate the effect of extreme beliefs.
4This property suggests that we could identify the set of rationalizable trajectories in the
RBC model using the findings of Guesnerie-Jara-Moroni (2010), who characterize rational-
izable equilibria in finite-dimensional models with strategic substitutabilities. Because our
model is infinite dimensional, the results in our setting are not immediate, however, and
left for future research. The results of next section suggest that the set under discussion is
(very) large.
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Agent  believes the real interest rate will be at its steady-state value after
period  ; thus he will hold consumption and savings constant from period 
onward. These constant values can be determined using the operators Γ and
Γ. Appendix A shows that we obtain:
Corollary 3 Suppose an agent has -period deviation beliefs (11). Then
() =
½ − ¡− ¯−1(1− )−¢  for 1 ≤   
− ¡ − ¯−1(1− )¢  for  ≥  (12)
() =
½  ¡1−  − ¯¢  for 0 ≤   
¯() for  ≥   (13)
Note that for   0 it follows that 0()  0, that () declines over
time for    , and that ()  0 for  ≥  . For  ≥  agent  consumes
the net return to savings, leaving the savings stock unchanged.
5 10 15 20
Figure 2: Savings plan for N-period beliefs when  = 10.
The expectation of a period of low interest rates associated with  () =  0 for  ≤  leads agents to shift consumption from the future to the
present. However, for our purposes equation (12) is more significant. Most
strikingly, for  ≥  the right-hand side implies that () becomes large (in
magnitude) as  gets large. Thus even if agent  thinks that capital deviates
from steady state by only some small , and only for some finite period of
time, his savings path will move away from, and remain arbitrarily far from,
the steady state, provided that period is long enough. The implications of
Corollary 3 are shown in Figure 2 in which we set  = 095  = 05 and
 = 10. The horizontal dashed lines at ± will be explained in Section 4.
With the operators Γ and Γ in hand we can now turn to our central
concern, which is the possibility of rational agents coordinating on the rational
expectations steady-state path.
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3 Eductive Stability
We first present a standard definition of eductive stability based on sim-
ple game-theoretical considerations, and by doing so we provide a “hyper-
rationality” view on expectational coordination. We then pursue a less sophis-
ticated view of expectational coordination, which reflects first-level rationality
considerations. These two viewpoints provide complementary insights on the
problem of expectational coordination. Our analysis initially will initially ab-
stract from the time dimension of the problem; then, after illustrating the
concepts in a simple cobweb framework, we reintroduce time and adapt the
general ideas to our infinite-horizon setting.
3.1 Local strong eductive stability
We begin by considering an abstract economy populated with a continuum of
rational economic agents. The agents know the logic of the collective economic
interactions (the underlying model). Both the rationality of the agents and the
model are Common Knowledge (CK). The state of the system is denoted 
and belongs to some subset E of a topological vector space.
Emphasizing the expectational aspects of the problem, we view an equi-
librium of the system as a state ∗ such that if everybody believes that it
prevails, it does prevail.
Under eductive learning, as described below, each agent contemplates the
possible states of the economy implied by the beliefs and associated actions
of the economy’s agents. Coordination on a particular equilibrium outcome
obtains when this contemplation, together with the knowledge that all agents
are engaged in the same contemplation, rules out all potential economic out-
comes except the equilibrium. If coordination on an equilibrium is implied
by the eductive learning process, then we say that the equilibrium is strongly
eductively stable.5 The argument can be either global or local. We now intro-
duce the local version of eductive stability. As we will see, even local stability
is at issue in our infinite-horizon model.
We say that ∗ is locally strongly eductively stable if and only if given
any open neighborhood  ⊂ E of ∗, there exists an open neighborhood
5The term “strongly rational” is also used. For details on the game theoretic background
of our investigation see Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni (2011). Matsui and Oyama (2006)
consider rationalizability of perfect foresight paths in continuous-time implementations of
repeated symmetric two-player normal-form games with finite actions. Other related investi-
gations include Jara-Moroni (2012) and Yu (2014). We view eductive stability as a zero-one
criterion. Less stringent indices of stability are developed in Desgranges and Ghosal (2010).
12
 (∗) ⊂  such that Assertion A implies Assertion B:
Assertion A: It is CK that  ∈  (∗).
Assertion B: It is CK that  = ∗.
We now describe a mental reasoning process induced by CK that can lead from
Assertion A to Assertion B:
1. Because all agents know that  ∈  (∗) it follows that all agents know
that each agent chooses a best response to their subjective probability
distribution over  (∗). It follows that all agents know that the state of
the system will be in a set E(1).
2. If E(1) is a proper subset of  (∗), the mental reasoning process goes
on as in step 1, but based now on E(1) instead of  (∗). In this case it
follows that all agents know that the state of the system will be in a set
E(2) ⊂  (∗).
3. The mental reasoning process continues provided that at each stage, E()
is a proper subset of E(− 1).
If the sequence {E()}≥1 is strictly decreasing and converges to {∗}, i.e.
E() ( E( − 1) and ∩≥1E() = {∗}, the equilibrium is locally strongly
rational or locally strongly eductively stable.6
Inspired by game-theoretic considerations,7 the ideas of eductive stability
have provided new tools for assessing the stability of expectational coordi-
nation in many different contexts: for early references see Guesnerie (2005)
and for some further references see Desgranges (2014). The connections of
the economically oriented applications to the game theoretical viewpoint, for
example the relationship between eductive stability and uniqueness of ratio-
nalizable strategies, are systematically assessed in Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni
(2011).8
3.2 Example: cobweb model
To illustrate the eductive approach, consider the cobweb model, studied by
Bray and Savin (1986) under adaptive learning and by Guesnerie (1992) under
6If the initial neighbourhood were equal to the whole space E, then the word global would
replace the word local. Note that a globally strongly eductively stable equilibrium is also
locally strongly eductively stable.
7The early discussion of rationalizability, putting emphasis on rationalizable beliefs, is
usually associated with the work of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).
8Most of their analysis is conducted in a finite-dimensional state space E. Thus their
results would require an extension to an infinte-dimensional setting to ensure applicability
to our RBC framework.
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eductive learning. The model is interpreted as a producers’ game in which the
strategy of each firm is its output and the optimal choice of output depends
on expected price.
Thus consider the following static, nonstochastic model. There is a unit
mass of firms  with identical technologies given by the cost function () =
(2)−12, with   0. Each firm  ∈  must make its production decision
before the price is known, and because it maximizes expected profits, it chooses
its quantity () based on its expected market price (), so that () =
(). Assume that market demand () is twice continuously differentiable
and decreasing in price . Market clearing requires
() =
Z

() = 
Z

()
By inverting demand, we obtain
 = −1
µ

Z

()
¶
 (14)
Because demand is downward-sloping there is a unique perfect foresight equi-
librium ∗ satisfying (∗) = ∗, with () = ∗ for all  ∈ . Equation
(14) to first order may be written
− ∗ = −
Z
(()− ∗) 
where  = −0(∗)  0 measures the expectational feedback.
We now ask under what conditions ∗ is locally strongly eductively stable.9
We consider here the linearized model. The argument is as follows. Let  be
a small open neighborhood containing ∗, and let  (∗) be an open interval
contained in  and centered at ∗. Suppose each agent believes that  ∈
 (∗), i.e. has a subjective probability distribution over  (∗) In the cobweb
model only the mean of the distribution, which can be viewed as the point
expectation, is needed for decision-making and thus for stability analysis.10 It
follows that  ∈ E(1) ≡  (∗), and if   1 then E(1) is a proper subset
of  (∗). Now suppose that it is common knowledge that  ∈  (∗). It
then follows that it is common knowledge that () ∈  (∗) for all , and
thus it is common knowledge that  ∈ E(1) The argument may be repeated
replacing  (∗) with E(1) Iterating this argument it follows that () ∈
9Guesnerie (1992) developed the global argument in a more general version of the model.
10In fact, it can be shown that point expectations are sufficient for stability analysis in
much more general settings: see Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni (2011) for details.
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E() ≡  (∗) for all  = 0 1 2   , so that local strong eductive stability
is implied. In contrast, local eductive stability fails if   1 since, even under
the local common knowledge assumption  ∈  (∗), hyper-rational agents are
unable to coordinate on  = ∗ through mental reasoning. Guesnerie (1992)
generalizes this argument to a global nonlinear set-up. See Appendix B for
the nonlinear argument using the language and notation developed here.
3.3 Local weak eductive stability
The above definition, based on the successive deletion of non-best responses
and starting under the assumption that the state of the system is close to the
equilibrium state, reflects the local version of a high-tech, i.e. hyper-rationality,
viewpoint. Another plausible intuitive definition of local expectational stabil-
ity, based only on individual-agent rationality, is the following: there exists a
non-trivial neighborhood of the equilibrium such that, if everybody believes
that the state of the system is in this neighborhood, it is necessarily the case,
whatever the specific form taken by each agent’s belief, that the state is in the
given neighborhood.11
Using the above terminology, we say that ∗ is locally weakly eductively
stable if and only if given any open neighborhood  ⊂ E of ∗, there exists
an open neighborhood  (∗) ⊂  such that Assertion A implies Assertion B:
Assertion A: All agents believe that  ∈  (∗).
Assertion B: The state of the system  generated by any collection of such
beliefs cannot contradict these beliefs, i.e.  ∈  (∗)
Again,  (∗) is an initial belief assumption, a universally shared conjecture
on the set of possible states, and for local weak eductive stability we require
that this belief cannot be falsified by actual outcomes resulting from individual
actions that are best responses to some probability distributions over  (∗).12
The argument is here low-tech in the sense that it refers to the rationality of
agents, but not to CK of rationality or of the model:13 the criterion focuses
on agents’ actions which depend only on their beliefs about the state of the
system, and not on their beliefs about other agents’ beliefs.
To put it another way, the criterion appeals only to the results of the first
step of the mental reasoning process specified in Section 3.1. It is then obvious
11The conjectural equilibrium bounds discussed by Benhabib and Bull (1988), in the
context of the overlapping generations model of money, has a similar motivation.
12Equivalently, in the absence of such a neighborhood  (∗), facts may falsify any col-
lective conjecture, whatever the proximity of the conjectured set to the equilibrium (unless
the conjecture is reduced to the equilibrium ∗ itself).
13It does not even require full knowledge of the model.
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that local strong eductive stability implies local weak eductive stability. The
close connections between the strong and weak criteria, as suggested in the
literature14 are fairly intuitive, and indeed obvious in the linear cobweb model,
where the reader can check that local strong eductive stability obtains when
  1 whereas local weak eductive stability requires only  ≤ 1.
We regard local weak eductive stability as a natural stability condition in
its own right: if ∗ is is locally weakly eductively stable then beliefs near ∗
lead to outcomes near ∗. Indeed our results in the RBC model in Section 4
are presented in terms of weak eductive stability.
Finally, concerning the connections between the eductive and the “evolu-
tive” or adaptive learning viewpoint, we note that failure to find a set  (∗)
for which the equilibrium is locally eductively stable signals a tendency for
any near-equilibrium states of beliefs to be driven away, thus threatening the
convergence of reasonable learning rules.15
3.4 Local eductive stability in the RBC model
Consider now the application of eductive stability to the RBC framework.
The equilibrium ∗ under consideration is given by  = ¯ for all  ≥ 0,
and the first issue concerns the notion of a neighborhood  (∗). We be-
gin with the assumption that agents believe that the path of capital will lie
within a “tube” or “cylinder” of radius   0 centered at the steady state, i.e.
 ∈ ¡¯ −  ¯ + ¢ for all  ≥ 1. These belief restrictions are captured by
considering as neighborhoods -balls in ∞ (N), centered at the steady-state
path. More generally we will consider belief spaces associated with topolo-
gies induced by weighted ∞ norms. Specifically, let  ∈ R be a sequence of
positive weights bounded away from zero, that is,   0 for all  ∈ N, andmin = inf∈   0 For  ∈ R, define
kk∞ = sup∈ ||
and let (∞(N ) k·k∞) ≡ ∞ be the Banach space of all real sequences  with
finite weighted norm kk∞. Observe that  = 1 for all  corresponds to the
usual ∞ norm. Allowing  to be any sequence of positive weights bounded
away from zero facilitates the analysis of eductive stability for beliefs that may
converge to the steady state along possibly complex paths. With this norm
14A formal statement of quasi-equivalence requires additional technical assumptions such
as the (weak) assumptions stressed of Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni (2011).
15More on this subject can be found in Guesnerie (2002), Guesnerie and Woodford (1991)
and Gauthier and Guesnerie (2004).
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the belief restrictions are captured by -balls,  (), of the form
 () =
½
{}≥1 ∈ ∞ : sup∈ | − ¯|  
¾

As we note below, if  =  for   1 a ball can be visualized as a tube with
shrinking radius.
With these notions and notations in place, local strong eductive stability
is given as follows: for any open neighborhood  ⊂ ∞ of
©¯ª≥1 there exists  0 such that Assertion A implies Assertion B:
Assertion A: It is CK that {}≥1 ∈  () ⊂  .
Assertion B: It is CK that {}≥1 =
©¯ª≥1.
Similarly, local weak eductive stability is given as follows: for any open neigh-
borhood  ⊂ ∞ of
©¯ª≥1 there exists   0 such that Assertion A implies
Assertion B:
Assertion A: Each agent believes {}≥1 ∈  () ⊂  .
Assertion B: Agents’ plans imply {}≥1 ∈  () 
In the next Section we will show the failure of local weak eductive stability in
the RBC model, and hence the failure of strong stability as well.
The notion of weak eductive stability just defined concerns the trajectory
of aggregate capital generated by plans chosen in time zero and adhered to in
perpetuity. Alternatively we could consider the trajectory of aggregate capital
generated by the choices made in real time, i.e. period by period, holding
beliefs { ()}≥1 about future aggregate capital fixed, but with agents con-
ditioning their time  choices on their realized time  capital holdings.16 The
corresponding paths, to first order, of agent ’s realized consumption and sav-
ing are given by Lemma 3. The steady state is said to be weakly eductively
stable in the alternative sense provided that the corresponding realized path
of aggregate capital does not contradict their beliefs that it remains in the
initial conjectured neighborhood. In fact, Lemma 3 immediately implies that
this weak stability alternative is equivalent to our original notion of local weak
eductive stability. Indeed, to first order, it follows from equation (10) that
agent ’s time  saving decision, +1(), depends only on his time  capital
holdings and his time  beliefs about the future path of aggregate capital: the
time  realization of aggregate capital does not impact his time  decision.
16That is, agent ’s time  savings decision, +1 () depends on his time  capital holdings
 (), and his beliefs path {+()}≥1
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4 Eductive Instability of the RBC Model
We are now ready to obtain our main result.
Theorem 2 Let  ∈ R be a sequence of positive weights bounded away from
zero. The perfect foresight steady state is not locally weakly eductively stable
with respect to the topology induced by the weighted ∞-norm k·k∞.
The intuition for the proof is straightforward for the case of uniform weights
 = 1 in the linearized model. While an argument for stability would require
considering heterogeneous and possibly stochastic beliefs, because the inten-
tion is to prove instability it is sufficient to assume homogeneity of beliefs and
to consider point expectations. The goal is to provide a collection of beliefs
paths that results in a corresponding path for aggregate capital that escapes
the -ball. We consider homogeneous -period deviation beliefs, as illustrated
in Figure 2 of Section 2. First note that, with homogeneous beliefs, individual
savings plan coincide with the implied aggregate path of capital. For   0, the
-ball () around the origin is indicated by the outer (red) dashed lines, and
the agents’ -period deviation beliefs , with  = 10 and 0   =   
for  ≤ 10, are shown by the open (blue) circles. The solid (blue) disks now
represent the implied path of aggregate capital . The essential observation
is that  is in () whereas  is not.
The economic intuition relies on Corollary 3. For expectations () =  0 for  ≤  , the optimal plan for agents is to increase consumption today
at the expense of future consumption. If   1 then for sufficiently large  the
positive impact on 0 will be large enough to be immediately destabilizing
in the short run in the sense that 1  −. However, even if  is small,
homogeneous expectations () =   0 for  ≤  and any  ∈ (0 ),
we eventually have   − if  is sufficiently large. The planned future
reduction in consumption is not enough to avoid, and is consistent with, 
leaving (). Note that  and  are chosen so that agents’ beliefs are consistent
with () while the aggregate planned trajectory of capital escapes it. While
the intuition is provided using the linearized model the proof given in the
Appendix allows for the nonlinear framework.
As just noted, given  , whether and when the implied path of aggregate
capital exits the -neighborhood depends on the magnitude of the expecta-
tional feedback parameter  This is illustrated in Figure 3, where the implied
paths of  are shown for four different values of  and the same belief path
as used in Figure 2. Observe that for small feedback  = 02 the implied path
remains in the ball (), though of course for sufficiently large  the path
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would exit () for  = 02. In this example  = 17 is sufficient. We remark
also that when  is sufficiently small the first  such that |()|   can
be relatively large. More specifically, under these beliefs it can be shown that
for   −1 aggregate capital  remains inside ().
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Figure 3: Implied paths of aggregate capital for  -period deviation beliefs with
 = 10 and with varying values of expectational feedback parameter .
Allowing for time-varying weights facilitates analysis of more general no-
tions of nearness, thus making our arguments robust to alternative topologies.
Note that the unit ball  in ∞ can be envisioned as a tube of radius one about
the horizontal axis. Given positive weights , the unit ball  in ∞ can be
similarly envisioned as a tube about the horizontal axis, but here the radius
at time  is −1 . Thus increasing weights result in a tube of shrinking radius.
Figure 4 provides an illustration based on the weights  =  where   1.
The intuition for the instability result in this case is as follows: the -ball can
be envisioned as a tube with radius decreasing to zero; the image of this ball
under the action of Γ represents the collection of all possible implied aggre-
gate paths. As depicted in Figure 4, this image takes the form of a tube of
increasing radius , which asymptotes to Ξ = ((− ) (− 1))−1  (1− ) .
Since Ξ  0 it follows that Γ (()) * ().
The negative result of Theorem 2 means that it is unlikely that rational
agents will be able to coordinate on the REE using eductive mental reason-
ing: rational agents cannot convince themselves that the rational expectations
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equilibrium will necessarily prevail.17 In light of this result we now turn to a
more flexible perspective in which boundedly rational agents revise expecta-
tions over time in response to observed data.
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Figure 4: Image of the tube () under the action of Γ for increasing
weights  = ,   1, i.e. the radius of the tube is shrinking at rate −1.
5 Eductive Reasoning and Adaptive Learning
The steady state ¯ is not eductively stable: knowledge by rational agents
that the path must be near ¯ cannot trigger coordination through mental
reasoning. Bounded rationality therefore seem unavoidable and this suggests
introducing real-time adaptive learning. At the same time, it is known that,
for a suitable and natural class of adaptive learning rules, the steady state is
locally asymptotically stable. This suggests a disconnect between the adaptive
and eductive approaches that is much more significant than previously noted
in the literature. However, a better way to proceed is to combine key aspects
of the two approaches, mixing adaptive learning with the considerations on
proximity of beliefs to the steady state associated with the eductive viewpoint.
17Instability results also appear in the adaptive learning literature. For example, Howitt
(1992) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003) show instability for a class of interest-rate rules in
monetary models. However, these models can also suffer from indeterminacy. The generic
instability result of the current paper is particularly striking since the RBC model is in
general well-behaved.
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5.1 The framework
We again endow agents with expectations about the future path of the aggre-
gate capital stock. These expectations are restricted to belong to a set, which
for convenience we will take to be (), the -ball for {}∞=1 associated
with uniform weights  = 1 for all  ∈ N. In this Section we restrict attention
to the linearized system. The set () can here be viewed as describing a
collective belief that provides bounds on individual beliefs. As in Section 2.2
and the eductive approach of Sections 3.4 and 4, agents’ decisions are based
on an assessment of the whole future,18 but now we look at the system in real
time. Our focus remains on whether the path for aggregate capital lies within
(). Now, however, in accordance with the evolutive or adaptive learning
viewpoint, the expected trajectory at time  is assumed not only to reflect
initial beliefs but also to respond over time to observed actual capital.
More precisely, we specify a set of adaptive learning rules that determine
the way initial expectations change along the real-time trajectory of aggre-
gate capital. Then, as in the eductive approach, we ask if the implied path
 = {}∞=1 will necessarily lie in (), i.e. if the collective belief, which
serves as a frame for the individual beliefs, is subject to real-time falsification.
If for some nonempty subset of adaptive learning rules, falsification is impos-
sible, then we say that the steady state is B-stable under evolutive (adaptive)
learning for those learning rules, and if this occurs for all adaptive learning
rules within the set of rules under consideration, we say the steady state is
robustly B-stable under evolutive learning.
5.2 The real-time system
In the real-time system we assume that at each time  each agent  solves
anew their dynamic optimization problem. That is, at each time  agent 
chooses +1() optimally given their savings, their expectations (which are
now revised each period) and the aggregate capital stock.
Equation (10) can be interpreted as the time  saving function of agent ,
since it relates the agent’s saving at  to his wealth (), and to expected
future prices, captured by +(). This equation motivates our interpre-
tation of  as an expectations feedback parameter:  measures the impact
18In the adaptive learning literature, within infinite-horizon models, this approach has
been followed, for example, in Sargent (1993, pp. 122-125), Preston (2006), Eusepi and
Preston (2011) and Evans, Honkapoha and Mitra (2009). An alternative approach in the
adaptive learning literature is based on one-step-ahead “Euler equation” learning. See, e.g.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Ch. 10.
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on savings of a permanent unit increase in expected future aggregate capital.
Allowing expectations to evolve over time, and using Lemma 3, the real-time
description of savings behavior is given by
+1() = ()− −1(1− )
X
≥1 
+() (15)
where now +() is the point expectation of aggregate capital in period+  held by agent  in period .
It can be seen from equation (15) that the agent’s decision +1() depends
on a single sufficient statistic for ©+()ª∞=1, given by
ˆ () = −1(1− )
X
≥1 
+()
The normalization factor −1(1 − ) ensures that the sum of the weights on
+() is one, so that
©+()ª∞=1 ∈ () implies ¯¯¯ˆ ()¯¯¯  .
We thus rewrite (15) as +1() = () − ˆ () and, following the
boundedly-rational adaptive learning approach, interpret this equation as pro-
viding a behavioral decision rule in which we re-envision the agent’s saving
choice as depending solely on current wealth and the sufficient statistic ˆ ().
For convenience we refer to ˆ () as “expected future capital.”
Finally we specify a simple adaptive scheme for the revisions of expecta-
tions over time: ˆ () = (1− )ˆ−1() +  where 0   ≤ 1, called
the gain parameter in the literature, describes how expectations reflect cur-
rent information about the actual capital stock.19 We note that this adaptive
scheme is equivalent to regressing aggregate capital on an intercept, allowing
for discounting of past data. This can be viewed as a special case of discounted
least-squares in nonstochastic models and is standard in the literature.
We are now in a position to describe the real-time evolution of the system.
For the sake of simplicity, we start from an initial situation in which the time-
zero belief is the same for everybody:
ˆ0() ≡ −1(1− )
X
≥1 
0() = ˆ0 
19Adaptive learning in nonstochastic models with infinite horizons often assumes that
forecasts are the same at all horizons. See, for example, Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra
(2009). In the current context this means + =  at  for all . Our formulation in
terms of ˆ allows for greater generality, while retaining a single sufficient statistic that is
updated over time. In stochastic models, the time pattern of variables can be estimated and
updated using recursive least squares. For technical reasons this procedure cannot be used
in nonstochastic systems. Intuitively, in a nonstochastic equilibrium the asymptotic lack of
temporal variation makes impossible consistent estimation of time-series parameters. See
Evans and Honkapohja (2001, pp. 152-154).
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and thus the sufficient statistics are initially, and remain, homogeneous across
agents. Finally, in line with our earlier analysis, we assume that 0 = 0.20
The homogeneity assumption allows us to calculate the resulting time path,
and is also illuminating in the sense that we would hope the system to be stable
under learning if we start with small expected future capital
¯¯¯
ˆ0
¯¯¯
. Under
homogeneity the system’s dynamics, which depend only on initial ˆ0 and on
the parameters  and , can be written as
+1 =  − ˆ and ˆ+1 = (1− )ˆ + +1 (16)
We can now return to the previously suggested concept of B-stability under
adaptive learning and give formal definitions.
Definition 2 The steady state is B-stable under adaptive learning for a given
0   ≤ 1 if, for all   0 sufficiently small, |ˆ0 |   implies that the
trajectory {}∞=1  generated by (16) remains in ().
Definition 3 The steady state is robustly B-stable under adaptive learning if
it is B-stable under adaptive learning for all 0   ≤ 1.
If the steady state is B-stable for some nonempty subset of 0   ≤ 1, but
is not robustly B-stable, then we will say that it is partially B-stable under
adaptive learning.
5.3 The results
The first result is again an impossibility theorem.
Theorem 3 Under adaptive learning the steady state is not robustly B-stable.
In fact the result might be expected in view of Theorem 2. The trajectory
under adaptive learning is continuous in  (for small   0 the -trajectory
is close to the  = 0 trajectory for a long period of time). The path of
 under adaptive learning and when  = 0 corresponds to the path that
would be realized by the actions of agents with the constantly held beliefs
 () = ˆ0 . Failure of robust B-stability would then follow by continuity
as a result of the impossibility of eductive stability.21
20Our results are qualitatively robust to small perturbations of intial aggregate capital.
21As shown by Lemma 3 the plans of agent  are to first order independent of aggregate
capital. The same must then be true for actual decisions when there are unchanged beliefs.
Hence if the trajectory of planned capital exits () then the same must be true for the
actual trajectory.
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A striking feature of Theorem 3 is that instability arises for small , which
in the adaptive and least-squares learning literature is usually viewed as a
stabilizing case (the “small gain” limit).22 In our approach, the problem is
that in this case the initial collective belief will be falsified, which we view as
a fragility of expectational coordination.
The instability result is stronger than stated in the following sense, which
can be verified from the proof of Theorem 3. Given   0, consider any initial
beliefs 0  |ˆ0 |  . Then there exists   0 such that the corresponding
trajectory under adaptive learning will have ||   for some  ≥ 1. That
is, starting from the steady state, all initial expectations, for appropriate ,
lead to paths  that leave ().
We next turn to partial B-stability under adaptive learning. We will see
that a natural necessary condition is given by asymptotic stability of the sys-
tem (16). Asymptotic stability is the classical stability criterion used for adap-
tive learning. We therefore start with the following result:
Lemma 4 System (16) is asymptotically stable if and only if   4−1 − 2
Asymptotic stability is a necessary condition for partial B-stability under
adaptive learning.23 Another necessary condition is given by  ≤ 1: indeed,
since 0 = 0 we have 1 = −ˆ0 . A more complete picture is provided
by the following Theorem.
Theorem 4 We have the following results on partial B-stability and asymp-
totic stability for the adaptive learning system (16) with   0 and 0   ≤ 1:
1. Given , the steady state is B-stable for sufficiently small .
2. Given  satisfying  ≤ 1:
(a) the steady state is not B-stable for sufficiently small ;
22The connection between eductive stability and adaptive learning has been discussed in
Evans and Guesnerie (1993), Guesnerie (2002) and Hommes and Wagener (2010). In short-
horizon set-ups, eductive instability is usually reflected in adaptive instability for large
gains (here   1 large). This is seen for the overlapping generations model with money in
Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) and Evans and Honkapohja (1995). We also note that in
experiments the complex expectational dynamics found in Hommes (2011) for the cobweb
model arise in the eductively unstable case. For related work see Bao and Duffy (2016).
23To see this, assume the system is not asymptotically stable. The eigenvalues in this
case are real. (The proof of Lemma 4 implies that in the complex case the modulus of the
eigenvalues is 1 − .) We must show that 0 = 0, ˆ 6= 0 leads to a divergent path.
Noting that (0 1) is not an eigenvector it follows that all initial conditions (0 ˆ) lead to
divergent paths provided at least one of the eigenvalues has magnitude larger than one.
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(b) the steady state is B-stable for sufficiently large ;
(c) the steady state is asymptotically stable for all .
3. Given  satisfying   1:
(a) the steady state is not B-stable for any ;
(b) for 1    2 the steady state is asymptotically stable for all ;
(c) for  ≥ 2 it is asymptotically stable for   4(2 + )−1.
This theorem emphasizes the relevance of the expectations feedback para-
meter  for understanding real-time learning. Indeed, the coefficient , stressed
in Sections 2 and 3, plays a key role in both partial B-stability and asymp-
totic stability under adaptive learning: small  is stabilizing and large  is
destabilizing.24 The left panel of Figure 5 captures the role of  for fixed .
Asymptotic stability holds for all examined values of , but B-stability only
for  = 01.
Figure 5: Aggregate capital paths under adaptive learning. Left panel:
maximum amplitude of paths increasing in feedback parameter . Right
panel: maximum amplitude of paths decreasing in gain parameter .
The right panel of Figure 5 looks at the role of  for fixed . Small values
of  generate the failure of robust B-stability under adaptive learning, even
though the asymptotic stability condition   4−1 − 2 is easier to satisfy
24Partial B-stability results for   1 exhibit a trade-off between  and : as  → 1
from below, the partial B-stability region tends to   12. Numerical results indicate
partial B-stability for  ∈ (() 1] where () is continuous and monotonically increasing
in  with () → 0 as  → 0. When  = 1 we have partial B-stability for  ∈ [12 1].
We note a discontinuity in B-stability for given , which is caused by first-period behavior:
1 = −0 implies B-instability for any   1.
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when   0 is small. The reason for this is that small  under adaptive
learning leads to a cumulative movement of aggregate capital away from the
steady-state value, which over finite time periods, as → 0, track the possible
 paths deduced by agents in our eductive setting.25
5.4 Discussion
We have assessed expectational coordination from two competing yet com-
plementary viewpoints — eductive and adaptive — and in both cases we have
shown that coordination is difficult to achieve. This difficulty relates to the
elasticities of economic outcomes to agents’ expectations, and the results of
Section 2 demonstrate that in the presence of far-sighted agents these elastici-
ties, which depend in part on the expectational feedback parameter , are very
high. The planning theorem implies a generic failure of local eductive stability
in the RBC model: rational agents would be unable to deduce coordination
on the REE.26 Hence full coordination on the REE, as of time zero, cannot be
expected based on full rationality and mental reasoning. This negative result
holds independently of  and the system characteristics, in sharp contrast to
previous eductive learning studies that emphasize significant classes of “good
cases” in which eductive considerations provide support for the possibility of
expectational coordination on the REE — see Guesnerie (2005).
Small  still favours coordination: as noted in Section 4, the length of time
for which plans will necessarily be compatible with initial beliefs that is near
the steady state is inversely related to . However, under eductive reasoning,
even with small  the incompatibility of aggregate plans with those beliefs will
eventually emerge; and, under adaptive learning with small gain  the path of
 will falsify those beliefs. In either case a crisis of beliefs could result, and
under adaptive learning, large cyclical swings can arise.
Our instability result is in striking contrast to results for dynamic mod-
els with short-lived agents. In Appendix D, available in the Supplementary
Materials, we study eductive stability in the standard overlapping generations
(OLG) model with capital in which agents live for two periods. We find that
25An interesting feature of the lack of robust B-stability under adaptive learning, which
can be seen in the proof of Theorem 3 given in the Appendix, is that the instability is
associated with long cyclical movements in .
26We do not claim that this difficulty occurs in every model with infinitely-lived agents.
For example, it would not occur in the world of Lucas (1978) for the reasons, which have
an eductive flavor, stressed in Section 6 of his paper. The difference in conclusions reflects
that in the Lucas tree model the dividend of a tree is exogenous, while in the RBC setting
beliefs of agents affect rental rates though the endogeneity of aggregate capital.
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the short planning horizon makes expectational coordination easier. In par-
ticular we obtain an eductive stability condition that is satisfied for frequently
employed parametric specifications of preferences and technology.
Returning to our RBC framework, a logical consequence of the failure
of eductive stability is that the evolution of the economy requires bounded
rationality considerations that incorporate adaptive learning rules. Theorem 3
provides results closely linked to eductive instability: while real-time adaptive
learning under small gain is asymptotically stable, the resulting time paths will
include periods of large deviations from the REE, even if initial expectations
are close to the steady state.
These results suggest that non-negligible deviations from the REE are
likely. Suppose, starting from a steady state, that there is a small shock to
expectations created by some news event. Not only will coordination on the
REE be impossible using eductive learning, but also some plausible asymp-
totically stable adaptive learning rules will necessarily first lead the economy
further away from the steady state.
Our eductive and adaptive results thus go hand-in-hand. The lack of educ-
tive stability in the RBC model is reflected in a lack of robust adaptive B-
stability. Thus the eductive viewpoint opens another door to the territories
being investigated in adaptive learning studies with long-horizon agents and
provides a powerful tool for their exploration.27
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the issue of coordination of expectations on the
benchmark rational expectations solution in the benchmark RBC model. The
difficulties of expectational coordination can be ascertained from two sides,
the eductive one and the adaptive one. In both cases, far-sighted agents are
sensitive to the whole path of expectations.
It is not surprising that long-run concerns influence present decisions and
future plans. However, the sensitivity to expectations of long-run plans envis-
aged today is extreme, and this is at the heart of the impossibility of eductive
stability: fully rational agents with knowledge of the structure and rationality
of other agents are unable to coordinate on RE. While rational expectations
is the benchmark solution, the failure of eductive stability in RBC models
indicates that real-time adaptive learning dynamics must play a role.
Under adaptive learning dynamics the sources of instability obtained in the
27For RBC models, important adaptive learning dynamics have been noted in Eusepi and
Preston (2011), Branch and McGough (2011) and Mitra, Evans and Honkapohja (2013).
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eductive framework remain pivotal. If the adaptation parameter is large then
unstable overshooting can arise in the short run, while if the adaptation rate
is small then low-frequency swings over the medium run will necessarily gen-
erate instability during the learning transition. Because occasional structural
shifts, policy changes or news events will in practice disrupt the equilibrium,
transitional learning dynamics will continue to be important.
Our findings indicate several directions for future research. First, our
generic eductive instability in the RBC model contrasts strikingly with ear-
lier research in short-horizon dynamic models, and with eductive stability in
a parametric class of overlapping generations growth models. The standard
assumption of infinite-lived agents in the RBC model clearly plays a major
role in the analysis of the RBC model, but of course the infinite-lifetime as-
sumption is made for theoretical convenience rather than empirical realism.
Future research should examine eductive stability in models with long but
finite lifetimes.
The other line of research suggested by our analysis is the incorporation
into adaptive learning of considerations that are central to eductive analysis.
Adaptive learning is a bounded rationality approach in which agents make fore-
casts based on statistical or econometric models that are updated over time.
An advantage of this approach is that the agents require minimal knowledge
of the economic structure and do not need to think explicitly about strate-
gic interaction, factors that are central to the eductive viewpoint. This is an
advantage but it may also be a disadvantage. If agents do understand the
economic structure and how the expectations of others help to determine key
economic aggregates, then it may be possible for them to use this information
within an adaptive econometric forecasting framework. Particularly for cases
in which eductive stability fails to hold, integration of eductive considerations
into adaptive approaches is a natural avenue for future research.
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Appendix A. Proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. From the agent’s flow budget constraint (2) we have, to
first order, that
+1() = (1 + ¯)() + ¯ () +  ()− () (17)
By constant returns to scale,  = ()− 0(), it follows that + ¯ =
0. Applying this observation to (17) yields (7). Under point expectations
equation (3) is
 0(()) = (1 + +1()) 0(+1())
Thus to first order
 00(¯)() = (1 + ¯) 00(¯)+1() +  0(¯)+1()
Using +1() =  00(¯)+1(), (1 + ¯) = 1 and the definition of  gives
(6).
Proof of Lemma 2. The agent’s lifetime budget constraint, with his transver-
sality condition incorporated, is given by
∞X
=0
 ()() =
∞X
=0
 () ()+(1+0)0(), where  () =
Y
=1
(1+ ())−1
and 0() = 1. We compute total derivatives at the steady state. Noting
from  () = −+1P=1  () that P≥0  () = −1¯ P≥1  () 
we obtainX
≥0
() = −10()+0+¯0+
X
≥1
 ()+¯−1
¡¯ − ¯¢X
≥1
 () 
At the steady state, we have ¯ = ¯ + ¯¯. Also, recalling  + ¯ = 0 it
follows thatX
≥0
() = −10() +
X
≥1
 ¡ () + ¯ ()¢ , thusX
≥0
() = −10() (18)
Recursively applying equation (7) from Lemma 1 to equation (18) completes
the argument.
29
Proof of Lemma 3. By recursive substitution the linearized Euler equation
(6) taken at time  gives +() = () + ¯ 00
P
=1
+() for  ≥ 1.
Applying Lemma 2 gives
−1() = (1− )−1() + ¯
00

X
≥1

X
=1
+()
Using
P
≥1 
P
=1 +() = (1 − )−1
P
≥1 +() yields the op-
timal plan for consumption (9). Combining this with (7) yields +1() =
() + ¯ 00
P
≥1 +() which is equivalent to (10).
Proof of Theorem 1. We start with the savings plan. It suffices to show
that
() = −
X
≥1
Θ · () (19)
satisfies (10) from Lemma 3, where we recall that
 = − 
2¯
(1− )
00 and Θ =
½ −(1− ) if 1 ≤   
1−  if  ≥  
We compute that () + ¯ 00
P
≥1 +()
= −X
≥1
Θ · ()− 
µ
1− 

¶X
≥1
+()
= −
X
=1
Θ · ()− 
X
≥1
¡−1(1− ) + (1− )¢ +()
= −
X
=1
Θ · ()− 
X
≥1
¡−1 − +¢ +()
= −
X
=1
Θ+1 · ()− 
X
≥1
−1 ¡1− +1¢ +()
= −
X
=1
Θ+1 · ()− 
X
≥1
Θ+1 + · +()
= −X
≥1
Θ+1 · () = +1()
This establishes the first part of Theorem 1.
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To prove the second part concerning the consumption plan, we combine
(9) from Lemma 3 with (19) to obtain
0() =
µ
1− 

¶
X
≥1
()
() = −
µ
1− 

¶

ÃX
≥1
Θ()−
X
≥1
+()
!
 for  ≥ 1
It is helpful to define Θ0 = 0, for  ≥ 1, and let  () be the indicator function
for the truth value of statement . Then agent ’s consumption plan may be
summarized as
() =
µ − 1

¶
X
≥1
¡Θ −  ( ≥ + 1)−¢ () (20)
for  ≥ 0. Recall that the first row of Θ corresponds to time  = 0 consump-
tion. It follows from equation (20) that
 = 0⇒ Θ+1 = −
  0⇒ Θ+1 =
½ Θ+1 − −(+1) if + 1 ≤ 
1−  if + 1   
The result follows.
Proof of Corollary 3. We apply Theorem 1. For 1 ≤    we have ()
equals − times
X
=1
Θ +
X
=+1
Θ =
X
=1
(1−  ) +
X
=+1
(− −  )
=
X
=1
(1−  ) + (1− )
−X
=1

= −  1− 

1−  + (1− 
)

1−  (1− 
−)
= − ¯−1(1− )−
For notational convenience, write  = Θ+1 . Then for 0 ≤    we have
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() equals − times
¯
X
=1
 + ¯
X
=+1
 = ¯
X
=1
(1−  )− ¯
X
=+1

= ¯
µ
−  1− 

1− 
¶
− ¯+11− 
−
1− 
= ¯− 1 +  
For  ≥  we have () equals − times
X
=1
(  ) =
X
=1
(1−  ) =  − 
1−  (1− 
) =  − ¯−1(1− )
and () equals − times
¯
X
=1
 = ¯
X
=1
(1−  )
= ¯
µ
 − 
1−  (1− 
)
¶
= ¯ ¡ − ¯−1(1− )¢ 
which implies () = ¯().
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall that we assume all agents hold initial savings
at the steady-state level, i.e. 0() = ¯. It is useful to work in deviation from
steady state form. Let
∆ = { − ¯}∞=1 ≡ {∆}∞=1
∆ () = { ()− ¯}∞=1 ≡ {∆ ()}∞=1
∆(∆ ()) = ©(∆ ())− ¯ª∞=0 ≡ {∆ ()}∞=1
(∆ ()) = {(∆ ())}∞=1 ≡ { ()}∞=1 
Here, ∆ is the path of aggregate capital, ∆ () is the belief path for agent
 of aggregate capital, and ∆(∆ ()) is the optimal savings plan for agent
 given beliefs ∆ (). Finally (∆ ()) = Γ (∆ ()) captures the
first-order approximation to ∆(∆ ()). We remark that in Section 2.2,
where we used first-order approximations, we identified ∆ with , whereas
here we distinguish them.
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It suffices to focus on homogeneous point expectations beliefs. Thus we con-
sider the behavior of an individual agent and drop the identifier  for notational
convenience. We will find ¯  0 so that if 0    ¯ then ∆(()) 6⊂ ().
There are two cases.
Case 1: inf∈ −1 = 0. For any ¯  0 let 0    ¯ and define
∆ =
½ −11  if  = 1
0 else

so that ∆ ∈ (). Since our representative agent believes that the real
interest rate will be at its steady-state value from period 2 onward, it follows
from the agent’s first-order conditions and his lifetime budget constraint that
for  ≥ 1 |∆ (∆)| = |∆1 (∆)|  0. Since inf∈ −1 = 0, we may
choose ˆ  0 so that −1ˆ   |∆1 (∆)|. It follows that
k∆ (∆)k = sup∈  |∆ (∆
)| ≥ ˆ |∆ˆ (∆)| = ˆ |∆1 (∆)|  
We conclude that ∆ (∆) ∈ ().
Case 2: inf∈ −1 = ¯−1  0. Note that ¯ ≥  for all  ∈ N. For   0, set
∆() =
½ 
2¯ if  = 1     
0 else

so that ∆() ∈ () for each  ∈ N. Let   1, and recall that, by
assumption, min = inf∈   0. Note also that, by Corollary 3,
 (∆()) = − ¡ − ¯−1(1− )¢ 
2¯ 
It follows that we may choose  so that for any   0,
| (∆())|  min 
Finally, restricting attention to -period deviation beliefs, we may interpret
∆ as a map from R to R, where R is endowed with the topology induced
by the weighted norm k · k. It follows that we may write ∆() = ()+
() where  is O ¡kk2¢, and use the second-order property of  to choose¯  0 so that
kk  ¯ =⇒ |()| 
µ − 1
2min
¶
kk
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It follows, for 0    ¯, that
k∆ (∆())k = sup∈  |∆ (∆
())|
≥  |∆ (∆())|
≥  (| (∆())|− | (∆())|)
 
µ 
min −
µ − 1
2min
¶
k∆()k
¶
 min
µ
1 + 
2
¶
  
which shows that ∆ (∆()) ∈ (¯).
We remark that while the proof relies on the specific form of Γ, Appendix
C of the on-line Supplementary Materials indicates that in a linearized setting
local strategic substitutability is sufficient for weak eductive instability.
Proof of Theorem 3. To examine B-stability we consider the system (16)
with the assumed initial conditions 0 = 0 and 0() = , where  = ±
for all . The dynamics of  can equivalently be written as
+2 = (2− (1 + ))+1 − (1− )
with 0 = 0 and 1 = −. The eigenvalues of the dynamic system are
1 2 = 1
2
n
2− (1 + )±√p(1 + )2 − 4o 
If (1 + )2  4 these eigenvalues are complex conjugates, and the solution
is given by  = −  sin sin(), where 2 = 1−  and
 = sin−1
µ
1
2
p
(1− )−1 (4− 2(1 + )2)
¶

If (1+)2  4 the eigenvalues are real and distinct (we omit the non-generic
case of repeated roots) and  = −(1 − 2)−1(1 − 2).
To show lack of B-stability for small   0, note that for sufficiently small
 the roots are complex and at  =  = 
2
 = − 2√p4 − (1 + )2 (1− )(4).
It can be verified that lim↓0  (()) = ±∞ where the sign is opposite to
the sign of . It follows that for   0 sufficiently small we have ||   for
values of  near  .
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Proof of Lemma 4. The system can be written asµ +1
ˆ+1
¶
=
µ
1 −
 1− (1 + )
¶µ 
ˆ
¶

Let  denote the 2 × 2 matrix that governs the dynamics. For asymptotic
stability we need both eigenvalues within the unit circle. Equivalently (see
LaSalle (1986), p. 28) we require |det()|  1 and |tr()|  1 + det().
Since det() = 1 −  the first condition is satisfied for all 0    1. Using
tr() = 2− (1 + ) leads to the stated condition.
Proof of Theorem 4. 1) (Sketch) For  sufficiently small, the eigenvalues
of the system (16) are real and positive. The proof of Theorem 3 shows that,
in this case, the path  is proportional to (1 − 2)(1 − 2), which, as a
continuously differentiable function of , has at most one critical point for   0.
This, together with the fact that the maximummagnitude of  is continuous
in , and approaches zero as  → 0, yields the result. 2) Asymptotic stability
is immediate from Lemma 4. Failure of B-stability for small   0 follows
from the proof of Theorem 3. To show B-stability for large   1, note that
for  = 1 the solution is  = −(1− ). By continuity {}∞=0 ∈ ()∞
for all   1 sufficiently large. 3) Lack of partial B-stability is immediate
since 1 = − for 0 = 0 and 0() = , where  = ± for all . The
asymptotic stability results follow from Lemma 4.
Appendix B. The cobweb model
Proposition B1 Consider the model (14) with  = −0(∗)
1. If 0    1 then ∗ is locally eductively stable.
2. If   1 then ∗ is not locally eductively stable.
The proof of Proposition B1 requires a Lemma concerning local contrac-
tions. If  : R → R and  ∈ N then let  denote the th-iterate of  . Let
(∗ ) be the open -ball about ∗. We say that  is a local ˆ-contraction
at ∗ provided that there exists ˆ ∈ (0 1) and   0 so that
|− ∗|   =⇒ |()− ∗| ≤ ˆ|− ∗|
Lemma B1 (Contraction Lemma). Suppose | 0 (∗) |  1 and  0 (∗) 6= 0.
Then there exists ˆ ∈ (0 1) so that  is a local ˆ-contraction. Further, there
exists   0 such that for all  ∈ N,  ((∗ )) ⊂ −1 ((∗ )).
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Proof of Proposition B1. First let
F ¡{()}∈¢ = −1µ Z ()
¶
and let () = −1 ( · ) be the supply given homogeneous expectations
() = . Suppose 0    1. Let  be an open neighborhood of ∗. We
first claim that if  is connected then F ¡¢ = (), where the superscript
indicated recursive composition. Since  captures homogeneous expectations,
it is immediate that () ⊂ F1 ¡¢; indeed, this holds regardless of whether
 is connected. Now let  ∈ F1 ¡¢. Then there exists a beliefs profile
{()} ∈  with
 = −1
µ
 ·
Z

()
¶

But
{()} ∈  =⇒ inf  ≤  ≡
Z

() ≤ sup
with the respective inequalities holding strictly if inf  sup ∈  respectively.
Since  is connected, it follows that  ∈  whence  = () ∈ ().
Having established F1 ¡¢ = (), we may proceed by induction. Since the
continuous image of connected sets are connected, we have by induction that
−1() = F−1 ¡¢ is connected. Thus
F() = 
³¡F−1()¢´ = F1 ¡F−1()¢ = F1 ¡−1()¢ = ()
and the result follows.
To complete the stability argument, let  be an open neighborhood of
∗. Now note that (∗) = ∗ and |0(∗)|  1 It follows from Lemma
B1 that there exists   0 such that (∗ ) ⊂  and  ((∗ )) ⊂
−1 ((∗ )). Also, since  is a local ˆ-contraction for some ˆ ∈ (0 1)
we have that  ((∗ )) ⊂ 
³
∗ ˆ
´
, so that
∗ ∈\

 ((∗ )) ⊂\


³
∗ ˆ
´
= {∗} 
Turning to part 2 of the proposition, suppose instead that   1. To show
instability we may consider homogeneous expectations. Write
()− ∗ = −( − ∗) + ( − ∗)
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where  is O ¡| − ∗|2¢. Choose  so that
 ∈ (∗ 2) =⇒ |(
 − ∗)|
| − ∗| 
− 1
2

Then  = ∗ +  implies
|()− ∗|  | − ∗|− |( − ∗)|
=
µ
− |(
 − ∗)|
| − ∗|
¶
| − ∗|

µ
1 + 
2
¶
| − ∗|  
Since ∗ +  is on the boundary of (∗ ) it follows by continuity that there
exists  ∈ (∗ ) so that |()− ∗|  .
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Appendix B: Proof of Contraction Lemma
Lemma B1 (Contraction Lemma). Suppose jf 0 (x) j < 1 and f 0 (x) 6= 0.
Then there exists ^ 2 (0; 1) so that f is a local ^-contraction. Further, there
exists " > 0 such that for all n 2 N, fn (B(x; "))  fn 1 (B(x; ")).
Proof of Lemma B1. Re-center so that x = 0 and let  = f 0(0). Now
observe that the f is a local ^-contraction at the origin. To see this, write
f(x) = x+ g(x), where g is second order in jxj. Choose " > 0 so that
jxj < " =)
g(x)x
 < 1  jj2 ;
and let
^ = jj+ sup
x2B(")
g(x)x
 < 1:
1
It follows that
jf(x)j 

jj+
g(x)x
 jxj < ^jxj;
as needed.
Turning to the main argument, rst suppose  > 0. Choose " su¢ ciently
small so that f is strictly increasing on B("). A simple induction shows that
fn is consequently strictly increasing on B("), from which it follows that
fn (B(")) = (fn( "); fn(")) 

^fn 1( "); ^fn 1(")

  fn 1( "); fn 1(") = fn 1 (B(")) :
Next assume that  < 0 and that " > 0 is chosen to be small enough
that f is strictly decreasing on B("). A simple induction shows that fn
is consequently strictly decreasing on B(") when n is odd and strictly in-
creasing when n is even, from which it follows that fn (B(")) = (nL; 
n
H) for
appropriate nL < 0 < 
n
H .
Observe that
(nL; 
n
H) = (f
n( "); fn(")) if n is even
(nL; 
n
H) = (f
n("); fn( ")) if n is odd.
We work by induction. Since f is a local ^-contraction at the origin, it
follows that f(B("))  B("). Assume the nesting holds for all k  n. By
induction, n 1L < 
n
L and 
n 1
H > 
n
H . Since f is decreasing, it follows that
f (nL) < f
 
n 1L

and f (nH) > f
 
n 1H

.
Case 1: n is even.
n+1H = f
n+1( ") = f (fn( ")) = f (nL) < f
 
n 1L

= f
 
fn 1(")

= fn(") = nH
n+1L = f
n+1(") = f (fn(")) = f (nH) > f
 
n 1H

= f
 
fn 1( ") = fn( ") = nL:
Case 2: n is odd.
n+1H = f
n+1(") = f (fn(")) = f (nL) < f
 
n 1L

= f
 
fn 1( ") = fn( ") = nH
n+1L = f
n+1( ") = f (fn( ")) = f (nH) > f
 
n 1H

= f
 
fn 1(")

= fn(") = nL:
This establishes the result.
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Appendix C: Strategic Substitutability
In this Appendix we establish the important connection between our in-
stability results and a natural notion of strategic substitutability in our dy-
namic innite-horizon setting. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the
linearized environment; and we focus on the behavior of a representative
agent, which allows us to drop reference to ! 2 I.
Recall that if dKe = fdKet g is the beliefs path of a given agent then
his corresponding savings plan is then given by dk(dKe) =  k(dKe), where
 k = f kt sgt;s1 is as dened in Section 2.2.1. Using this notation, we may
write
dkt =
X
s1
 kt s  dKes :
We say that the map  k exhibits local strategic substitutability provided that
 kt s < 0 for all t; s 2 N. The following result emphasizes that our main
instability result is implied by the local strategic substitutability of  k.
Theorem C1 Let ' 2 RN be a sequence of positive weights satisfying 'min =
infn2N 'n > 0: If  
k exhibits local strategic substitutability, and if
  inf
n>0
j knnj > 0;
then there exists " > 0 so that 0 < " < " implies  k (B(")) 6 B(").
Proof. Let " > 0 and 0 < " < ". Let "t = "2't and dene
Ket (";N) =

"t if t = 1; : : : ; N
0 else
;
so that Ke(";N) 2 B(").
Next, let dk(";N) = dk (Ke(";N)), and notice that since dKeN+s(";N) =
0 for s > 0, it follows that dkN+s(";N) = dkN(";N) for s > 0. This allows
us to compute
dkN+1(";N + 1) = dkN+1(";N) +  
k
N+1;N+1  "N+1
= dkN(";N) +  
k
N+1;N+1  "N+1
 dkN(";N)    "N+1:
3
Substituting in recursively and using dk0(";N + 1) = 0, we have
dkN+1(";N + 1)   
N+1X
m=1
"m:
Now set sN =
PN
i=1 "i. We claim that for any  > 0, there is some N so that
sN > 2"N . Indeed, if sN diverges the result follows from the fact that
2"N  "
'min
<1;
otherwise, sN is increasing and 2"N ! 0. This shows
kdk(";N + 1)k' = sup
t2N
't jdkt(";N + 1)j  'N+1jdkN+1(";N + 1)j
 'N+1 
 

N+1X
m=1
"m
!
= 'N+1  (sN+1)
> 'N+1  (2"N+1) = ";
so that  k (B(")) 6 B(").
We note that by Corollary 1 of the main text,  k exhibits local strate-
gic substitutability. Since infn>0 j knnj = (1   ) > 0, Theorem C1 yields
Theorem 2 of the main text as a corollary. Also, Corollary 1 and Theorem
C1 focus on the implications of local strategic substitutability precisely be-
cause our map  k exhibits this characteristic; however, analogous results with
analogous proofs hold for maps that exhibit local strategic complementarity.
Appendix D: A Finite-horizon Model with Capital
Here we show that eductive stability can obtain in a nite horizon model
with capital. To show this we examine a dynamic model with the shortest
possible horizon: the two-period OLG model with capital.
Population is constant and normalized to one, and all markets are com-
petitive. Let !t be an agent born at time t. He is endowed with one unit of
labor, which he supplies inelastically for real wage qt. He then allocates his
income between savings s(!t) = k(!t) and consumption c1(!t). In period
t + 1, this agent is now old: he rents his savings for net real return rt+1,
4
consumes the gross return, plus his share of prots from ownership of rms,
and dies. Thus agent !t solves the following problem
maxE(!t) fu (c1(!t); c2(!t))g
s.t. c1(!t) + s(!t) = qt (1)
c2(!t) = (1 + r
e
t+1(!t))s(!t) + (!t) (2)
Notice that when agent !t makes his savings decision, he does not know the
value of rt+1. Below we assume constant returns to scale production so that
 = 0.
The agent !ts rst-order condition is given by
uc1 (c1(!t); c2(!t)) = (1 + r
e
t+1(!t))uc2 (c1(!t); c2(!t)) : (3)
Equations (1)(3) may be used to compute the savings decision of agent !t
based on current and expected future factor prices:
s(!t) = s(qt; r
e
t+1(!t)):
Firms hire workers and rent capital in competitive factor markets, and
employ constant returns to scale technology to manufacture goods: Y =
f(K;L); thus prots are zero and factors prices are given by the respective
marginal products: q = fL(K; 1)  fL(K) and r = fK(K; 1)  fK(K).
Capital is inelastically supplied in the morningby the old and depreciation
is zero: the capital accumulation equation is given accordingly by
Kt+1 =
Z
s(!t)d!t =
Z
s(qt; r
e
t+1(!t))d!t:
Assuming agents know the relationship between real interest rates and mar-
ginal products, and so form expectations of aggregate capital instead of real
interest rates, we have
Kt+1 =
Z
s
 
fL(Kt); fK(K
e
t+1(!t))

; (4)
whereKet+1(!t) is agent !ts forecast of aggregate capital tomorrow. Equation
(4) captures the dynamics of the economy: given aggregate capital today and
forecasts of aggregate capital tomorrow, the actual value of aggregate capital
tomorrow can be determined. It also highlights a key di¤erence between
5
the OLG model and the RBC model: in the OLG model aggregate capital
depends only on one-period-ahead forecasts; in the RBC model, aggregate
capital depends on forecasts at all horizons.
Adopting for open sets the standard topology on R, the following result
characterizes stability:
Theorem D1 The steady state K is locally strongly eductively stable if and
only if @s=@r  fL( K; 1); fK( K; 1)  fKK   K; 1 < 1: (5)
This theorem can be established using a formal argument analogous to
the proof of Proposition B1, and for this reason, we omit the details here.
Intuitively, if condition (5) holds then an iterative argument shows that pe-
riod t = 0 young agents will conclude that K1 = K. For young agents at
time t = 1 the situation is then identical to the situation at time t = 0. Thus
at t = 1 agents will conclude that K2 = K and this implies that it will be
the case that K2 = K. An induction argument completes the proof.
We remark that this stability result is local and can provide a renement
criterion in the case of multiple steady states.
As an exercise for illustrating our results, we specify particular functional
forms and conduct numerical analysis. Assume utility is time separable and
takes the constant relative risk-aversion form
u(c1; c2) =
1
1  
 
c1 1 + c
1 
2   2

;
for  > 0; and assume that production is Cobb-Douglas, f(K;L) = KL1 .
In this case there is a unique positive steady-state level of capital, and pa-
rameter values for  and  completely characterize the model. For all para-
meters examined  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 100) the steady state is strongly
eductively stable.
This example provides a striking contrast to the coordination problems
we have demonstrated for the RBC model with innitely-lived agents.
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